Verifiable secret sharing (VSS) is a fundamental cryptographic primitive, lying at the core of secure multi-party computation (MPC) and, as the distributed analogue of a commitment functionality, used in numerous applications. In this paper we focus on unconditionally secure VSS protocols with honest majority.
Introduction
Verifiable secret sharing (VSS) [CGMA85] , where a dealer wishes to share a secret among a group of n parties, at most t of which (possibly including the dealer) may be actively malicious, is a fundamental cryptographic primitive, lying at the core of secure multi-party computation (MPC) [GMW87, BGW88, CCD88] and used in a myriad of applications. Our focus in this paper is on unconditionally (a.k.a. information-theoretically) secure VSS protocols (meaning that the security properties are guaranteed to hold even when the malicious parties are endowed with unbounded computational power) with honest majority (t < n/2). In the unconditional setting, it is typically assumed that parties are connected pairwise by authenticated, private channels, and that in addition they have access to a "broadcast" channel. Broadcast allows one party to send a consistent message to all other parties, guaranteeing consistency even if the broadcaster is corrupted. Because broadcast cannot be simulated on a point-to-point network when more than a third of the parties are corrupt [LSP82] , even probabilistically, it is impossible to construct VSS (or more generally, MPC) protocols in this setting without using a "physical broadcast channel" (that is, a black-box which securely implements broadcast), or some equivalent addition to the model. presented in [KK07] , and the key method is what the authors called moderated protocols. This method is a generic transformation which given any protocol Π employing broadcast channels, constructs a "moderated" version Π ′ of Π where all calls to broadcast channels are substituted with a special broadcast simulation subroutine controlled by a designated party (called the moderator). A new key technical element in our construction is to show how using one round of physical broadcast (the first one in our stage-1 protocol) one can prepare a setup which allows to invoke sufficiently many broadcast simulation routines later on. This transformation yielding the final VSS protocol is presented in Section 3.2. As our focus in this work is on reducing the overall number of broadcast rounds, rather than broadcast (or otherwise) communication complexity, we forgo explicit treatment of the latter. We do however note that protocols described herein can be compiled via generic techniques into significantly more communication-efficient versions; see work of Fitzi and Hirt [FH06] , as well as recent work by BenSasson et al. [BFO12] .
Related work. We already mentioned above the most closely related work regarding unconditionally secure VSS for t < n/2 [Rab94, KPC10] . The role of broadcast in multiparty protocols has been studied in a number of other previous works. Katz et al. [KKK08, KK07, Koo07] , seeking to improve overall round complexity when broadcast is simulated over point-to-point channels, construct constant-round protocols for VSS and MPC whose descriptions use only a single broadcast round. However, for t < n/2 they assume a PKI infrastructure (e.g., pseudosignatures [PW96] -more on this below) is already in place. Fitzi et al. [FGMR02, FGH + 02], as well as Goldwasser and Lindell [GL05] , consider broadcast and MPC protocols for t < n which do not use physical broadcast at all (nor equivalent assumptions), but instead weaken the guarantees provided by the protocol. In particular these protocols are not robust and so may fail to deliver any output at all. On the other hand, the so-called detectable broadcast (and detectable MPC ) protocols of [FGMR02, FGH + 02] do achieve consistency among honest players: either the broadcast (MPC) succeeds and all honest parties receive output, or it fails, in which case all honest parties agree that it failed. As mentioned above, unconditionally secure broadcast cannot be simulated on a point-to-point network when more than a third of the parties are corrupt. However, if there is a setup phase during which the parties enjoy access to a physical broadcast channel (but need not know their future inputs), Pfitzmann and Waidner [PW96] showed how to construct pseudosignatures, an information-theoretic authentication technique for multiparty protocols which can then be used to simulate future invocations of broadcast by running a so-called "authenticated" Byzantine agreement protocol [DS83] ; this avoids any need for a physical broadcast channel during the main phase of the protocol. The number of broadcast rounds in the [PW96] setup construction is O(n 2 ), and it works for an arbitrary number of corruptions (t < n). This was later improved to O(n) broadcast rounds by Beerliová-Trubíniová et al. in [BTHR07] , at the price of tolerating t < n/2 corruptions, and recently by Hirt and Raykov to just 1, as mentioned above. However, the overall round complexity of this construction (as well as that in [BTHR07] 
) is O(n).
Minimizing the use of broadcast has also been considered in the related problem known as secure message transmission by public discussion (SMT-PD), where a Sender wants to send a message to a Receiver privately and reliably. Recall that in this problem, Sender and Receiver are connected by n channels, up to t < n of which may be maliciously controlled by a computationally unbounded adversary, as well as one public channel, which is reliable but not private. SMT-PD was introduced in [GO08] as an important building block for achieving unconditionally secure MPC on sparse (i.e., not fully connected) networks. The motivation for this abstraction comes from the feasibility in partially connected settings for a subset of the nodes in the network to realize a broadcast functionality despite the limited connectivity [DPPU86, Upf92] , which plays the role of the public channel. Such implementation of the public channel on point-to-point networks is costly and highly non-trivial in terms of rounds of computation and communication, as mentioned earlier. See, e.g., [GGO11] for further details.
We now turn to the presentation of the model, definitions and building blocks, followed by the new VSS protocol (Section 3). Some of the auxiliary constructions and proofs appear in the appendix.
Model, Definitions and Tools
We consider a complete, synchronous network of n players P 1 , . . . , P n who are pairwise connected by secure (private and authenticated) channels, and who additionally have access to a broadcast channel. Some of these players are corrupted by a centralized adversary A with unbounded computing power. The adversary is active, directing players under his control to deviate from the protocol in arbitrary ways. As noted, we consider only static rather than adaptive adversary in this work, meaning that he chooses which players to corrupt prior to the start of protocol execution. The computation evolves as a series of rounds. In a given round, honest players' messages depend only on information available to them from prior rounds; A, however, is rushing, and receives all messages (and broadcasts) sent by honest players before deciding on the messages (and broadcasts) of corrupted players. Sometimes we refer to A thus defined as a t-adversary. We consider statistical security (since, as mentioned above, perfect security is unachievable in this setting), and let κ denote the error parameter, κ ≥ 2n. [RB89] is a triple of protocols (ICSetup, ICValidate, ICReveal) which achieves a limited signature-like functionality for three players: a dealer D, intermediary I, and receiver R. D holds as input a secret s ∈ F, which he passes to I in ICSetup. ICValidate insures that even if D cheats, I knows a value which R will accept. In ICReveal, I sends s to R, together with some authenticating data, on the basis of which R accepts or rejects s as having originated from D. More formally, the scheme should satisfy the following guarantees:
Information checking. An information checking scheme (IC)
Correctness: If D, I, and R are honest, then R will accept s in ICReveal. Non-Forgery: If D and R are honest, then R will reject any incorrect value s * ̸ = s passed to him in ICReveal, except with negligible probability. Furthermore, we will call a WSS(-without-agreement) linear if it satisfies the following in addition:
Linearity: If D has properly committed to several secrets {s (k) }, then he may (without further interaction) invoke WSS-Rec to decommit to any (public) linear combination of the s (k) . If some of the commitments are garbage, there still exists a fixed value s * ∈ F ∪ {⊥} which is reconstructed as the "linear combination" (w.h.p.). We can slightly strengthen this requirement in the case of the sum of two values, to say that if one is properly committed and the other is garbage, their sum is garbage also (as opposed to any fixed value, which Linearity gives). We will use this property later on in the construction of VSS protocols.
Proper + Improper: If D has committed separately to s ∈ F and to ⊥, then the reconstruction of the sum s + ⊥ (or ⊥ + s) will yield ⊥ (w.h.p.).
Our WSS(-without-agreement) protocol is presented in Section 3.1. It has a single sharing phase, which uses two broadcasts, and two different reconstruction phases: one which uses a single broadcast round and achieves ordinary WSS, and one which uses no broadcast but achieves only WSS-withoutagreement. [CGMA85] is a pair of protocols (VSS-Share, VSS-Rec) for a set of players P = {P 1 , . . . , P n }, one of whom, the dealer D, holds input s ∈ F. In addition to the Privacy property above in the WSS case, VSS must satisfy the following, stronger guarantee in the presence of an unbounded adversary corrupting up to t of the parties:
Verifiable secret sharing. An (n, t)-verifiable secret sharing scheme
Commitment: W.h.p., at the end of VSS-Share there exists a fixed value s * ∈ F, defined by the joint view of the honest parties, such that all honest parties will output s * in VSS-Rec. If D is honest, then s * = s. VSS strengthens WSS by guaranteeing that even when a cheating D does not cooperate in the Reconstruction phase, the honest players can still recover the value he committed to (which we now require to be a proper field element, not ⊥). This makes possible a stronger variant of linearity, in which honest players can reconstruct linear combinations of secrets shared by different dealers. This strong linearity property is crucial for MPC applications of VSS. We say that the parties verifiably share a secret s if each (honest) party maintains some state such that, when the honest parties invoke VSS-Rec on that joint state, they will reconstruct the value s (w.h.p.). Clearly, if a dealer D has just completed VSS-Share with effective input s, then the parties verifiably share s.
Linearity: If the parties verifiably share secrets {s (k) }, then they also (without further interaction) verifiably share any (public) linear combination of the secrets.
We now turn to broadcast-type [LSP82] primitives over point-to-point channels (and slightly extended communication models; see below) which will become useful when further reducing the number of physical broadcasts (Section 3.2).
Gradecast. Graded broadcast (a.k.a. "gradecast") was introduced by Feldman and Micali [FM88] . It allows to broadcast a value among the set of recipients but with weaker consistency guarantees than in the case of standard broadcast, where all honest recipients are required to output the same value. In addition to the value v i each recipient P i also outputs a grade g i ∈ {0, 1}. Formally, a protocol achieves graded broadcast if it allows the dealer D ∈ P to distribute a value v ∈ D among parties P with every party P i outputting a value v i ∈ D with a grade g i ∈ {0, 1} such that: [Fit03] gradecast is considered in different communication models. First, it is shown that gradecast is achievable from point-to-point channels if and only if t < n/3. Second, an extended communication model is considered where each player can broadcast to a (every) pair of other players. Such a primitive is called 2-cast. A construction is then given which tolerates t < n/2 and achieves binary gradecast given 2-cast channels. In this paper we will make use of a round-efficient gradecast protocol allowing arbitrary domains D based on that construction. Our construction works as follows: First, we construct a weak broadcast primitive (see next) given 2-cast; then, based on weak broadcast we build gradecast.
Weak broadcast. Weak broadcast (a.k.a. Crusader agreement [Dol82] ) is another weak form of broadcast, where the recipients either decide on the value sent by the dealer or on a special symbol ⊥ indicating that the dealer is malicious. Formally, a protocol achieves weak broadcast if it allows the dealer D to distribute a value v ∈ D among parties P with every party P i outputting a value v i ∈ D ∪ {⊥} such that:
In Appendix B we present modifications to the gradecast and weak broadcast protocols in [Fit03] to allow for arbitrary domains D, instead of just the binary domain.
A Broadcast-and Round-Efficient VSS Protocol
In this section we present our new (2, 0)-broadcast, constant-round VSS protocol for t < n/2. Its overall round complexity is (20, 1). This is the first linear VSS protocol enjoying such a small number of broadcast rounds without trusted setup, while running in an overall constant number of rounds. We first obtain a (3, 0)-broadcast, (9, 1)-round protocol which, at a high level, is inspired by the ((7, 0)-broadcast) protocol in [RB89] ; we then apply a moderated-protocol transformation to shave off one additional broadcast round.
A (3, 0)-broadcast, constant-round VSS protocol
Our VSS protocol's sharing phase uses a WSS protocol, which we now describe. Our WSS(-without-agreement) protocol uses two broadcasts in its sharing phase, and admits two different reconstruction phases: one which uses a single broadcast round and achieves ordinary WSS, and one which uses no broadcast but achieves only WSS-without-agreement. In turn, the protocol makes use of a linear IC subprotocol based on that in [CDD + 01] (Appendix A). The WSS protocol(s) is shown below. Since its sharing and reconstruction phases are invoked at different rounds of the VSS protocol's sharing phase, we specify them as separate protocols for convenience. The WSS protocol, with its two different reconstruction phases.
Protocol WSS-Share(P, D, s)
1. D chooses a random polynomial f (x) of degree ≤ t such that f (0) = s, and sets s i := f (i); this will be P i 's share. For each pair
Protocol WSS-Rec(P, D, s)
2. BROADCAST: D broadcasts the polynomial f (x) which he used to share the secret. P i broadcasts the list of pieces {(j, s j )} which he accepted in ICReveal in the previous step.
Let HAPPY denote the set of players who accept at least n − t pieces, and all of whose accepted pieces lie on the polynomial f (x). If |HAPPY| ≥ n − t, all players take s = f (0) to be the secret, otherwise ⊥.
1. For each pair P i , P j ∈ P − {D}, run ICReveal(P i , P j , s i ). If P i accepts at least n − t pieces, and all accepted pieces lie on a polynomial f (x) of degree ≤ t, then P i takes s = f (0) to be the secret, otherwise ⊥. Proof. Commitment. First consider a cheating D. At the end of WSS-Share, an honest P i holds s i which all honest parties will accept (due to the Commitment property of the IC protocol). Now these pieces s i held by the honest parties define a polynomial f * (x); if deg f * (x) > t, then each honest party will accept pieces not lying on the dealer's broadcast polynomial f (x). Therefore we will have |HAPPY| < n − t, and ⊥ will be reconstructed. Note that this situation is precisely a garbage commitment. Otherwise deg f * (x) ≤ t (and the commitment is proper). If the dealer's broadcast polynomial f (x) ̸ = f * (x) then again each honest party will accept pieces not on f (x), and so ⊥ will be reconstructed. If f * (x) = f (x) then it may be the case that ⊥ is reconstructed (depending on the values honest parties accept from dishonest parties), or that s * = f (0) = f * (0) is reconstructed. Regardless, there is only one non-⊥ value which may be reconstructed, and it is fixed by the joint view of the honest parties at the end of WSS-Share. Now if D is honest, then by the IC Non-Forgery property no cheating party can fool an honest party into accepting a value other than s i during ICReveal (except with negligible probability). It follows that each honest player will accept ≥ n − t pieces, and all their accepted values will lie on the dealer's polynomial f (x). Thus |HAPPY| ≥ n − t and the parties output s = f (0).
Privacy. If D is honest, then by the IC Privacy property, the adversary has no information on any s i value held by an honest player P i prior to ICReveal. Hence the adversary learns only the t points on the polynomial f (x) corresponding to dishonest players' shares, and in particular has no information on f (0) = s prior to WSS-Rec.
Commitment Without Agreement. Define f * (x) as above, by the shares of the honest parties. As before if deg f * (x) > t, all honest parties will accept a set of pieces which do not lie on any degree t polynomial, and they will all output ⊥. If deg f * (x) ≤ t, then honest party P i will output s * = f * (0) only if all the pieces he accepts from dishonest parties lie on f * (x); otherwise the set of pieces he accepts will lie on no polynomial of degree t, and he will output ⊥. For an honest D, the argument is the same as in the with-agreement case: Due to IC Non-Forgery, all honest parties will (w.h.p.) accept only values which lie on f (x), and so all will output the correct value s = f (0).
Linearity. Suppose D has properly committed to values {s (k) }, using polynomials f k (x). Then for each value s (k) , player P i holds a share s during ICReveal (in place of "s i "), and D broadcasts the linear combination of these polynomials (in place of "f (x)"). Then the properties of commitment and privacy remain in place, since taking a linear combination of polynomials of degree at most t results in a new polynomial of degree at most t. If some of the commitments were garbage, this means exactly that some of the polynomials (defined by the shares of the honest players) were of degree > t. Nevertheless, taking a linear combination of these polynomials results in a single, fixed polynomial whose free term is the only possible non-⊥ value which honest parties will reconstruct (and then only if the new polynomial has degree ≤ t).
Proper + Improper. A proper commitment is associated with a polynomial of degree ≤ t, and an improper commitment with one of degree > t. Thus the sum of the two has degree > t, corresponds to another improper commitment, and will yield ⊥ (w.h.p.).
We are now ready to present VSS 3bc , our (3, 0)-broadcast, (9, 1)-round VSS protocol, which uses the WSS protocol above in its sharing phase. Regarding the presentation of our protocol(s), many VSS protocol descriptions rely on a bivariate-polynomial approach; others are univariate-based. We opt for the latter, since we feel that this protocol's structure lends itself best to a univariate polynomial description. At a high level, the protocol is inspired by that of Rabin and Ben-Or [RB89] , and has a similar structure. First D distributes shares of a t-degree polynomial f where s := f (0) and of additional random t-degree polynomials g k . Each player P i commits to all shares via WSS. Then the parties jointly carry out a cut-and-choose process in which the players are challenged to reconstruct either g k or f + g k for each k, which must be degree t. Players who complain of incompatible shares, or fail to participate, have their shares broadcast (and hence fixed) by D. As mentioned earlier, Rabin and Ben-Or's VSS requires 7 broadcast rounds in the share phase. One novelty which allows us to reduce broadcast round complexity to 3 is that we require the dealer as well as the players to commit via WSS to the shares he distributed, which constrains the misbehavior of a cheating dealer. After all commitments are in place, the players broadcast a round of cut-and-choose challenges in step 7. In step 8, parties respond to the challenges by using WSS-without-agreement to reconstruct the shares of the appropriate polynomials. In the final step 9, a broadcast is used to confirm the results of the WSS-without-agreement; at the same time D has a chance (and is obligated) to broadcast shares of players for whom he did not reconstruct the correct share in step 8. An additional trick which saves us a broadcast round can be seen in step 6, which is inserted between the last two rounds of the WSS share phase. In this step, the parties perform a pre-broadcast by sending each other player their intended WSS final-round broadcast on point-to-point channels. In step 7, they officially complete WSS by echoing the pre-broadcast. This forces a cheating player to "semi-commit" in step 6 to one of at most n−t possible final-round broadcasts for WSS, since a majority (including at least one honest player) must confirm his pre-broadcast. Luckily, semi-commitment restricts cheaters' options enough that players are able to broadcast the cut-and-choose challenges in the same roundstep 7-rather than waiting for full commitment and then using another broadcast. (Note that in the case of a non-rushing adversary, step 6 is unnecessary.)
Protocol VSS-Share 3bc (P, D, s)
1. D chooses a random polynomial f (x) of degree ≤ t such that f (0) = s, and sets s i := f (i). Also for 1 ≤ k ≤ κn, D chooses random polynomials g k (x) of degree ≤ t, and sets In addition to broadcasting his view as described above, D also accuses player P j , by publicly broadcasting the shares (s j , {t kj } k ), if either of the following occurred:
(1) D output ⊥ in any WSS-Rec-NoBC instance for which P j was dealer; or (2) D reconstructed an incorrect value for P j 's share of any challenge polynomial (v * (D) kj
If any such public pieces fail to lie on the appropriate degree-t polynomial, or if D neglects to accuse P j when there exists a BC consensus that v * kj ̸ = v kj , then D is disqualified. Let HAPPY denote the set of non-disqualified players who were not accused by D. If
Protocol VSS-Rec 0bc (P, s)
Each player
Each player P i ∈ P creates a list of shares consisting of those s j which he accepts from any WSS-Rec-NoBC(P j , s j ) (including his own), together with all public pieces s j . He takes any t + 1 shares from the list, interpolates a polynomial f (x), and outputs s := f (0) as the secret.
Theorem 2. Protocol VSS 3bc = (VSS-Share 3bc , VSS-Rec 0bc ) is a (3, 0)-broadcast, (9, 1)-round, linear verifiable secret sharing scheme secure against an unbounded adversary who corrupts t < n/2 players.
The number of broadcast rounds, as well as total number of rounds, is easily verified by inspection. In particular, broadcast is used in rounds 5, 7 and 9. We will specifically reference these rounds in the next section, where we only keep first and third broadcasts. The proof of Theorem 2 is broken up into three lemmas, as follows.
Lemma 3 (Privacy). If D is honest, then w.h.p. the adversary A gains no information on s prior to VSS-Rec 0bc .
Proof. The secret-sharing properties of degree-t polynomials assure that the joint distribution of all shares handed by D to the corrupted parties in step 1, is uniformly random, in particular independent of s. By the privacy property of protocol WSS employed in steps 2-7, the individual shares (s i , {t ki } k ) of any honest party remain independent of the adversary's view. If in step 7 D broadcasts (s i , {t ki } k ) for some P i who conflicted with D in an instance of ICValidate, then that P i must have been corrupt and hence A already knew these values (as well as the fact that D would broadcast them). In step 7, A learns the honest parties' random challenges, which are independent of s and its shares, and thus yield no additional information. The values reconstructed in step 8 are, for each challenge, either f (x) + g k (x) or g k (x). The g k (x)'s themselves were chosen uniformly at random, and until step 8 A knew nothing about them except for the shares held by corrupt parties, by WSS Privacy. Hence, conditioned on A's view up to that point, the revealed polynomial is uniformly random subject to consistency with the shares held by corrupted parties. Since D is honest he will answer all challenges correctly, and so A knows in advance that all honest parties will "accept" D's responses. The proof of this lemma is a bit laborious, and is presented in Appendix C.
Lemma 5 (Linearity). If the parties verifiably share secrets {s (k) }, then they also (without further interaction) verifiably share any (public) linear combination of the s (k) .
Proof. Consider the situation when parties verifiably share a secret s according to the protocol, for a dealer D who was not disqualified. By Claim 13 of the Commitment proof, we know that w.h.p. D's WSS-commitment to s i is proper for all i, and Claim 15 ensures that each happy player has properly WSS-committed to the same value. Since happy P i have made proper WSS-commitments, the linearity of WSS-commitment implies that such P i can reveal (and are committed to) any linear combination thereof. Now consider secrets s (k) which are verifiably shared with shares s
(We ignore the "shares" of players who are disqualified in some execution of VSS-Share 3bc -such players must be corrupt and without loss of generality other players simply ignore their messages and shares during VSS-Rec 0bc .) Then any t+1 of the summed shares
, which is of degree ≤ t with free term
. For any given non-disqualified P i each share s i 's since the other players need only add the public values to the reconstructed value to obtain the "true" share
(And revealing the sum of all shares reveals exactly the same information as revealing the sum of the non-public shares.)
Further reducing the number of broadcast rounds
We now show how to modify protocol VSS-Share 3bc so that only two rounds of broadcast suffice. This improvement is inspired by the transformation presented in Section 3.3 of [KK07] . We execute the transformation in three steps. First, we show how using one round of physical broadcast one can prepare a setup (details below) which allows to simulate sufficiently many gradecast channels later on. Second, we consider a moderated version of VSS-Share 3bc where the dealer acts as the moderator. Third, we instruct the players to use one more round of physical broadcast in order to agree on whether the moderator behaved correctly or not. The overall construction results in a constant-round share protocol which uses physical broadcast in two rounds only-one for gradecast setup generation and one for agreeing whether the dealer's moderation was honest. First, we describe two additional building blocks used in our transformation.
Gradecast from setup. In [HR13] , Hirt and Raykov recently showed how to prepare a setup allowing to simulate 2-cast channels (protocols Setup 3 and Broadcast 3 in [HR13] ). The setup protocol Setup 3 takes 3 rounds, where in the first two rounds point-to-point channels are used and in the third round a physical broadcast is used. The protocol Broadcast 3 simulating 2-cast from the prepared setup uses point-to-point channels during 3 rounds. Since gradecast is achievable from 2-cast channels in settings with t < n/2 (recall the description of gradecast in Section 2; see also Lemma 10), we can interpret the setup for 2-cast channels as a setup for gradecast channels. Let the protocol SetupGradecast be defined to generate such a setup, i.e., SetupGradecast runs sufficiently many instances of Setup 3 for each triple of players in parallel. The following lemma summarizes the security achieved by the pair of protocols (SetupGradecast, Gradecast).
Lemma 6. Protocol Gradecast is a 6-round protocol achieving gradecast from a setup and point-topoint channels tolerating t < n/2 malicious parties. Moreover, the setup used by protocol Gradecast is prepared using the 3-round protocol SetupGradecast, where in the first two rounds point-to-point channels are used and in the third round physical broadcast is used.
Moderated VSS. In [KK06] , Katz and Koo proposed a new primitive called moderated VSS which allows to execute VSS under the supervision of a designated party called the moderator. If the moderator is honest, then the resulting protocol actually achieves the security properties of VSS; otherwise no security is guaranteed. Formally, a two-phase protocol for parties P, where there is a distinguished dealer D ∈ P who holds an initial input s and a moderator P * * ∈ P (who may possibly be the dealer), is a moderated VSS protocol tolerating t malicious parties if the following conditions hold for any adversary controlling at most t parties:
Each honest party P i outputs a bit f i at the end of the sharing phase, and a value s i at the end of the reconstruction phase. If the moderator is honest during the sharing phase, then each honest party P i outputs f i = 1 at the end of this phase.
If there exists an honest party P i who outputs f i = 1 at the end of the sharing phase, then the protocol achieves VSS; specifically: (1) if the dealer is honest then all honest parties output s at the end of the reconstruction phase, and the joint view of all the malicious parties at the end of the sharing phase is independent of s, and (2) the joint view of the honest parties at the end of the sharing phase defines a value s ′ such that all honest parties output s ′ at the end of the reconstruction phase.
Theorem 7 ([KK06]). Assume there exists a constant-round VSS protocol Π, using a broadcast channel in the sharing phase only, which tolerates t malicious parties. Then there exists a constant-round moderated VSS protocol Π ′ , using a gradecast channel and tolerating the same number of malicious parties.
The compilation of Π into Π ′ is achieved by requiring the players to use a "moderated broadcast subroutine" to simulate broadcast. Each time players invoke the subroutine they update their flag f i indicating whether the broadcast simulation has been successful. Players start executing Π ′ with f i set to 1. The moderated subroutine Modercast for party P i broadcasting a message m is defined as following.
Protocol Modercast(P, P * * , P i , m) 1. P i gradecasts the message m.
2. The moderator P * * gradecasts the message he output in the previous step.
3. Let (m j , g j ) and (m ′ j , g ′ j ) be the outputs of party P j in steps 1 and 2, respectively. Within the underlying execution of Π ′ , party P j will use m ′ j as the message "broadcast" by P i . 4. Furthermore, P j sets f j := 0 if (1) g ′ i ̸ = 1, or (2) m ′ i ̸ = m i and g i = 1. 3 We are now ready to show the enhanced VSS protocol.
A (2, 0)-broadcast, constant-round VSS protocol. In order to reduce the number of rounds where physical broadcast is used we apply the following transformation to the protocol VSS-Share 3bc :
1. First, we generate gradecast setup using protocol SetupGradecast.
2. We then run a moderated version of the protocol VSS-Share 3bc , where the dealer acts as a moderator. The Modercast subroutine uses two sequential gradecast invocations that are simulated using the setup prepared by the protocol Gradecast.
3. Finally, each player broadcasts (using physical broadcast) his flag f i indicating whether he trusts the moderator (who is also the dealer). If the number of players broadcasting 1 is greater than n/2 then the sharing phase was successful, otherwise the dealer is disqualified.
The second and the third steps of the transformation have been already proposed by Katz and Koo in [KK07] , while in the first step they make use of a pre-distributed PKI acting as a setup for gradecast. In our transformation, instead of assuming a PKI we generate a setup for gradecast using the protocol SetupGradecast. We call the modified sharing phase VSS-Share 2bc . Furthermore, in VSS-Share 2bc we optimize the round complexity of the transformation by parallelizing the beginning and the end of VSS-Share 3bc with SetupGradecast and broadcasting the flags, respectively.
1-2. Players execute rounds 1 and 2 of the protocol SetupGradecast in parallel with rounds 1 and 2 of VSS-Share 3bc .
3-5. BROADCAST: Players execute round 3 of the protocol SetupGradecast and rounds 3-5 of VSS-Share 3bc . Each player broadcasts the concatenation of the values resulting from protocols SetupGradecast and VSS-Share 3bc .
6. Players execute round 6 of the protocol VSS-Share 3bc .
7-18. MODERCAST: Players execute round 7 of VSS-Share 3bc where the Modercast subroutine is used instead of broadcast. The subroutine invokes two gradecast channels sequentially. Each call to the gradecast channel is simulated using the protocol Gradecast, which takes 6 rounds.
19. Players execute round 8 of the protocol VSS-Share 3bc .
BROADCAST:
Players execute round 9 of VSS-Share 3bc . Each player additionally broadcasts flag f i indicating whether Modercast was successful. If the number of f i = 1 is greater than n/2, then the sharings generated by VSS-Share 3bc are accepted; otherwise, the dealer is disqualified. Proof sketch. Due to Theorem 2 the protocol VSS 3bc = (VSS-Share 3bc , VSS-Rec 0bc ) is a linear verifiable secret sharing scheme secure against an unbounded adversary who corrupts t < n/2 players. Hence, due to Theorem 7 the protocol VSS-Share 2bc obtains a moderated VSS protocol when substituting broadcasts in VSS-Share 3bc with Modercast. Finally, due to the definition of moderated VSS, if there exists at least one honest party with f i = 1 then the moderated version of VSS-Share 3bc achieves VSS. Hence, since t < n/2, if more than n/2 parties broadcast f i = 1 then VSS-Share 2bc achieves VSS; otherwise the dealer is corrupt and hence can be disqualified.
complexity, and seeked to minimize the number of rounds in which it is invoked as well, presenting a (2, 0)-broadcast, constant-round VSS protocol for t < n/2. This is the first linear VSS protocol enjoying such a small number of broadcast rounds without trusted setup, while running in an overall constant number of rounds. Lemma 10. The protocol Gradecast tolerates t < n/2 corruptions and achieves gradecast from 2-cast channels.
broadcasts, hence with probability ≥ 1 − (n − t) 2 2 −κ = 1 − negl, D and P i will be committed to reconstruct unequal values regardless of which broadcasts they choose in step 7. Since BC consensus exists for each of these unequal values (otherwise one or both of D, P i are disqualified), D will be disqualified unless he accuses P i in step 9. 
D is partially committed to the set (s i , {t ki } k ) at the end of step 6, in that there are at most n − t possible broadcasts he can successfully make in step 7 to conclude the WSS. In step 8, based on the step 7 challenges, he must reconstruct either the values v ki = s i + t ki , i.e. the polynomial f (x) + g k (x), or the values v ki = t ki , i.e. the polynomial g k (x). Again, for any single, fixed broadcast D could make, and given honest challenge, the probability that he can successfully decommit in step 8 (leading to a BC consensus in step 9 involving only polynomials of degree ≤ t) is negligible; hence even allowing him to choose from among the n − t, his success probability remains negligible, and w.h.p. he will be disqualified.
Claim 17. No honest player P i is disqualified. (Hence at the end of VSS-Share 3bc , each honest player is either happy, or has been accused by D and his shares made public.)
Proof. Honest P i will not be disqualified for misbehaving during any WSS subprotocol. In step 6, P i will faithfully send his pre-broadcast to all other honest players, hence at least t + 1 players will confirm it in step 7, and he will not be disqualified there. In step 8, the properties of WSS-Rec-NoBC ensure that for an honest dealer all honest players will correctly reconstruct v * ki , thus these values will have BC consensus in step 9 (in which P i participates), and he will not be disqualified there. As for honest D, the same holds. Additionally, since he will have shared s i and {t ki } k using polynomials of correct degree, and announce correct public pieces in step 7, then all values v ki which he reconstructs in WSS-Rec-NoBC in step 8 will lie on polynomials of appropriate degree.
Recall that in VSS-Rec 0bc , each happy party whose share s i is not yet public is supposed to invoke WSS-Rec-NoBC(P i , s i ) to reveal it. By Claim 15, we see that all parties in HAPPY can reveal only the share s * i = s i (or possibly no share at all, if dishonest). In short, all public pieces and all committed values of happy parties are equal to s i and thus lie on f (x), which is of degree ≤ t (Claim 16). Since only such shares are used during VSS-Rec 0bc to construct f (x)-and since at least all ≥ t + 1 shares associated with honest parties will be recovered by every honest party-each honest player will reconstruct f (x) and output s = f (0), a value which is fixed by the joint view of the honest parties at the end of VSS-Share 3bc . It is easy to see that if in fact D is honest, then the polynomial f (x) will satisfy f (0) = s, and all honest parties will reconstruct the correct value. Finally, as shown above, if D is dishonest and not disqualified, then w.h.p. the secret s * which he commits to is f (0), where f interpolates all values s i which D committed to via WSS. In turn, the values s i are computable from D's view of the shares D distributed in the WSS sharing phase, which are themselves computable from D's messages in the underlying IC protocols. Hence the criterion for input independence holds as well.
